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FORGING FINALITY: SEARCHING FOR A
SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
DOUBLE-SUIT DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets
and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.'
Justice Burger noted in The Bremen majority opinion over twenty
years ago what has become today a mere truism. Transnational
transfers of goods, services, people, and judicial judgments are now
common in the modem global market. Litigants are more frequently
seeking remedies in foreign courts, and in this age of transnational
investment, losing parties are rarely caught with substantial assets in
more than one country.2
Executing judgments abroad becomes more difficult when the
parties take advantage of the principle of comity and pursue
concurrent parallel suits in different forums.3 In these parallel
proceedings the parties reverse their roles as plaintiff and defendant,
and the proceedings are often sought by each party in the forum most
favorable to its cause of action. The problems caused by these
concurrent parallel suits, or "double-suits," arise where one party
seeks a negative declaration of liability in a different forum. This
situation exists among the states of the United States as well as
between independent nations. The problems caused by double-suits
include elimination of a plaintiff's relief breach of comity, inconve-
nient litigation, and difficulty in preserving the local forum's impor-
1. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1971).
2. As used in this Note, 'foreign' refers to courts other than those of the nation being
discussed.
3. Comity is a procedure by which courts of one state or jurisdiction defer to the laws or
judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction based on mutual respect rather than obligation.
BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 267 (6th. ed. 1990).
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tant public policies.4 These problems seem to have been largely
alleviated within the United States by the federal court rules of proce-
dure.5
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceed-
ings in foreign courts, however, and thus far, no firm rules beyond the
nebulous notion of international comity exist between sovereign
nations to promote similar judicial restraint. Hence, when a defen-
dant in a United States civil suit subsequently sues in a foreign court
for a declaration of nonliability, an unpredictable and often tenuous
judicial dilemma arises. Among United States courts, action or
inaction in these cases is governed purely by nonstatutory law. "The
law [regulating this situation] is somewhat less developed... [which]
is somewhat surprising, given the fear that parties embarking on
litigation with foreign parties must often have that, unless restrained,
their adversaries will take actions that will make ultimate victory
pyrrhic."6
A declaration of nonliability issued by a foreign court on the
same issues involving the same parties as a suit in the United States
is a powerful litigation tool: a foreign negative declaratory judgment
will form a barrier to any later attempts by the United States plaintiff
to secure recognition or enforcement of a contrary United States
judgment in the foreign forum.7 When the defendant's assets are
within that foreign forum, a victorious plaintiff from a United States
court is left with a hollow judgment and no remedy; the United States
court has not protected its litigants and has not protected its judg-
ment.
One of the most harmful effects of foreign declarations of a
foreign declaration of nonliability is that this form of individual relief
4. See George A. Bermann, The Use Of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation,
28 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 589, 594-599, 606-609 (1990).
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (requiring that related claims between the same parties be
joined into a single suit as a rule of compulsory counterclaims); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)
(allowing any United States court with proper jurisdiction to declare with the force and effect
of a final judgment the rights and other legal relations of any party seeking such a declaration,
regardless of whether further remedies are sought); Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978)
(foreclosing from federal courts the equitable power to enjoin state court proceedings except
where specifically authorized by Congress or where necessary to preserve its jurisdiction or the
effect of its judgments).
6. David Westin & Peter Chrocziel, Interim Relief Awarded by U.S. and German Courts
in Support of Foreign Proceedings, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 723, 723 (1990).
7. See Yasuhiro Fujita, U.S.-Japanese Transactions and Litigation: The Kansai Iron Works
Case, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA 196,200-201
(John 0. Haley ed., 1978).
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has the potential to alter trade patterns.8 "International commerce
depends in no small part on the ability of merchants to predict the
likely consequences of their conduct in overseas markets. Predictabil-
ity depends in turn on an atmosphere of cooperation and reciprocity
between nations."' Savvy businesses will most likely steer away from
transactions involving nationals of forums which regularly allow this
double-suit tactic. Similarly, businesses in countries which benefit
from reciprocal judicial enforcement guarantees with many other
nations, as in trading blocs like the European Union (EU), may opt
to deal exclusively with those blocs. Loss of international trade and
cooperation harms the entire global economy.'0 Particularly in light
of strong trading blocks like the EU," all efforts must be made to
invite trade outside of and between trading blocks. Impediments such
as these protective judicial procedures and the absence of recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments should be eliminated before
too many corporations and individuals feel the sting of unsatisfactory
legal relief and turn away from those markets. 2
Although the broad-based consequences of negative declaratory
judgments arising in double-suits stem from judicial action, solving the
international dilemma should not be left to the judiciary to adjudicate
on a case-by-case basis. In the United States, the powers to formulate
and regulate foreign policy are given to the legislative and executive
branches of our government. 3 Litigants must know they can rely on
the dictates of the federal methodology: the judiciary follows the
international policy and rationale set by the legislative and executive
branches and applies it in each case with consistency.
8. See Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992) (dis-
solving a preliminary injunction which would have prevented an American lender from initiating
legal action against a Hong Kong borrower in Hong Kong courts).
9. Id.
10. Id at 1354.
11. The European Union is moving toward its goal of a united Western Europe by planning
for additions to its current 12-nation membership on January 1,1995. Sweden, Austria, Finland,
and possibly Norway will be the newest members since 1986 when Spain and Portugal joined
the group, formerly known as the European Community. Europe Opens Way to Three New
Members, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 1994, at All. The addition of all four countries would bring
the bloc's population to 375 million. Id
12. See Preliminary Document No. 17 for the Attention of the Special Commission of June
1992 on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Some Reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a General Convention on Enforcement of
Judgments 4 (May 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reflections on a General Convention].
13. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10; id., art. II, §§ 2, 3.
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The courts alone cannot establish rules which will be binding in
other sovereign nations and cannot expect to elicit reciprocity from
other courts without an international agreement made by the leaders
of foreign nations and our own executive branch. 4 A multilateral
agreement, formulated by the executive branch and approved by the
Senate, is the only solution which could formalize the notion of
comity between nations and assure reciprocity, consistency, predict-
ability, judicial efficiency, and equity between and among internation-
al judicial forums.
This Note will argue that the myriad legal problems caused by
foreign negative declaratory judgments and the implications these
declarations have for international comity can be assuaged only by
international cooperation in a convention that commits nations to the
elimination of the exercise of negative declaratory judgments. Part II
will examine the current international legal situation regarding
double-suits from the perspective of United States litigants. Part III
explores the response of the EU to the dilemma. The ultimate
solution advocated in Part IV is to utilize the structure of a multilater-
al convention to address the problems raised by preemptive declarato-
ry judgments and double-suits and to improve the current notions of
comity. Only this firm multilateral action will successfully and
equitably serve litigants who take their judgments abroad for
enforcement.
II. THE DOUBLE-SUIT AND JUDICIAL
INEFFECTIVENESS
A. Comity and the Parallel Proceeding Rule
The doctrine of comity is pervasive in judicial decisions involving
international issues or multinational parties in courts of many
countries. It has been noted that "comity is to be preferred to
combat.' 15 The customary international law principle of comity has
14. See Masaki Bussan Corp. v. Nanta Seimei Col, 1390 HANnJ 98, 764 HANTA 98 (Tokyo
Dist. Ct., Jan. 29, 1991), translated in 35 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 171. The court in that case,
acknowledging the place of the policy-making branches of Japanese government due to the
sensitive international factor inherent in transnational double-suits, stated that "In consideration
that the present-day huge volume of international transportation and trade is accompanied by
a lot of international civil disputes, we have to attach importance to the legislative reasons for
the recognition of foreign judgments... and the avoidance of double examinations and conflicts
of judgments." 35 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. at 174.
15. Hayes Indus., Inc. v. Carribbean Sales Assocs., Inc., 387 F.2d 498, 502 (1st Cir. 1968).
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historically been relied upon as an argument for judicial restraint.
Comity is the general notion of "friendly dealing[s] between nations
at peace,' 16 and as such, it applies not just to the judiciary, but also
to the policy-making bodies of the nations. It is not a written law, but
a duty:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. ... it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.17
United States judicial policy has traditionally been supportive of
the notion of comity, presuming its applicability and its necessity to
the functioning of the international legal system. One circuit court
described the integral nature of this principle as "the mortar which
cements together a brick house."' 8 However, although United States
and foreign courts stress the importance of adhering to this doctrine
with vigor, they are deficient at defining comity with any specificity.
The inherent difficulty behind following such an amorphous, purely
voluntary policy of noninterference with other sovereign forums lies
in its character as a "never-never land whose borders are marked by
fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy, and good faith."'9 For the United
States, these "fuzzy lines" have been drawn in such a way that final
judgments of competent courts in foreign nations are enforced in a
generally reciprocal fashion." Although reciprocity is no longer a
prerequisite to recognition in the United States,21 the normal
16. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,162 (1895) (Mr. William G. Choate, argument for defen-
dants in error).
17. Id. at 163-64.
18. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
19. See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 (1982).
20. See, eg., Hilton, 159 U.S. at 166 (determining that a judgment rendered in France
against a United States citizen was only prima facie evidence in an action brought upon the
judgment in the United States because French courts do not recognize the judgments of United
States courts as conclusive).
21. See Charles L. Rosenzweig et. al., The Need For Treaties Governing the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, COM. & FED. LTIo. SEc.
5 (1991-1992) [hereinafter N.Y. STATE BAR REPORT].
1994]
368 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:363
interplay between United States courts and those of other nations still
places a predominant emphasis on comity.'
A common law doctrine related to comity is the parallel
proceeding rule.' This rule, like comity, is not found in any statute
or treaty, but provides guidance where jurisdictional overlaps occur
with foreign courts. The rule is considered well-established by United
States case law and is followed consistently, such that "where
judgment sought is strictly in personam, both [courts], having
concurrent jurisdiction, may proceed with the litigation at least until
judgment is obtained in one of them which may be set up as res
judicata in the other."2 4 Because of this principle, United States
courts rarely issue restraining injunctions that would prevent litigants
from bringing the same suit in foreign courts.'
While this policy does serve the fundamental goals of comity by
counseling noninterference in the proceedings of other sovereign
states, its effectiveness depends upon the soft ground of foreign res
judicata. All jurisdictions do not, with any degree of predictability,
grant res judicata effect to other nations' judicial judgments. 26 When
a victorious plaintiff in a United States court brings the judgment to
a foreign jurisdiction to collect from the defendant's assets, the litigant
22. But see Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 78-79 (Eng.
C.A.) (decision of Lord Denning). A British citizen filed suit in the United States, and the de-
fendant petitioned the British court to enjoin the plaintiff from pursuing its pending suit abroad.
Lord Denning acknowledged in his opinion that a conflict of jurisdiction existed between the
United States and British courts, but caustically noted that comity necessitates that one court
give way. He based his decision to uphold the anti-suit injunction in part on his distaste for the
United States judicial system and on his belief that the defendant desired to prosecute in the
United States for purely selfish reasons: "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn
to the United States." Id. at 74.
23. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 929; GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 319 (2d ed. 1992).
24. Princess Lida of Thum and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939). See also
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 887 (3d Cir. 1981);
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926-927; Black & Decker Corp. v. Sanyei Am. Corp., 650 F.Supp.
406, 408 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
25. This doctrine of judicial restraint is hardly absolute, and its application is even less
predictable. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 931 n.73. United States courts sometimes utilize
the tool of anti-foreign suit injunctions in order to protect against the evasion of their judgments,
to prevent vexatious litigation, to prevent relitigation of issues abroad, or to protect their own
jurisdiction when foreign courts attempt to "carve out exclusive jurisdiction over concurrent ac-
tions." Id. at 927-28, 930. While these anti-suit injunctions are issued in personam, they clearly
affect foreign sovereign judicial activity. See Compagnie des Bauxites, 651 F.2d at 887.
Therefore, they should be issued "only with care and great restraint." Canadian Filters
(Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969).
26. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 23, at 337.
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has moved into very unsure judicial territory. Regardless of custom-
ary international law, if the defendant has sought and gained a
negative declaratory judgment in that forum, the United States
plaintiff's judgment is worthless.27 The irony is in the result:
claiming preservation of comity principles, United States courts
generally refuse or hesitate to issue anti-foreign suit injunctions' in
order to prevent defendants from pursuing declaratory judgments of
nonliability abroad.29 This hesitancy allows a foreign court to breach
comity with the United States at the expense of individual United
States plaintiffs. The entire principle of comity has been undermined
and the plaintiff ultimately has no means of recovery.
Where foreign jurisdictions issue declaratory judgments of
nonliability in favor of a defendant in an American suit,"0 the tradi-
tional United States non-response which relies on these common law
precepts, maintaining the expectation that or disregarding whether its
judgment will be reciprocally upheld abroad, does not best serve the
United States plaintiff or the United States courts.
B. United States Courts: Inconsistent Responses to Double-Suit
Threats
United States courts currently tend to recognize only two
classifications of threats to their jurisdiction: where the basis for
jurisdiction is in rem or quasi in rem, or where the foreign court is not
merely exercising parallel jurisdiction, but is attempting to acquire
exclusive jurisdiction over the action.3 The courts have traditionally
protected their jurisdiction and the plaintiff's case if either of these
situations is proven, even if it has been at the expense of comity.
27. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
28. An anti-foreign suit injunction is the same as an anti-suit injunction issued by a foreign
court (enjoining a party from filing suit in another jurisdiction), but it describes the judicial
action from the perspective of the domestic jurisdiction and specifically enjoins the filing of a
suit in a foreign jurisdiction.
29. See supra note 25.
30. United States courts have also issued declarations of nonliability in highly unique
situations which have effectively stymied a foreign plaintiff's case abroad. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 591 F. Supp. 293, 295-97, 308 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(involving a contract with the Iranian Air Force and the intervention of the Iranian Revolution
in 1978); however, this Note only addresses the situation in which United States plaintiffs are
affected by foreign declarations of nonliability.
31. China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987).
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The "role of the judiciary in any system [is] the protection of the
litigants."'32 The United States judiciary is also expected to protect
itself, however, as shown by Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion, which grants powers to federal courts which extend to all cases
or controversies,33 and by Congress, which has granted the federal
courts the related power to protect their jurisdiction and effectuate
their judgments.' 4 United States courts have issued anti-foreign suit
injunctions for that protective purpose where direct aggressive moves
have been made by foreign courts.3' However, United States courts
have generally ignored or have been unaware of the fact that even if
their proceedings are concluded without intrusion from a foreign
court, their judgments may not be honored due to a double-suit with
preemptive effects. 36 They have been mostly concerned about their
immediate ability to continue their hearing and render a judgment.37
The United States Circuit Courts are currently split regarding the
potential detrimental effects of foreign declarations of nonliability as
well as the proper weight with which to assess comity.38 Thus, even
when similar balancing tests are applied, each United States court
may arrive at different results. Cases which have dealt with this
equitable dilemma in United States courts vary greatly and therefore
32. Richard G. Singer, Justiciability and Recent Supreme Court Cases, 21 ALA. L. REv. 229,
231 (1969).
33. U.S. CONST. art. IIL, § 2, cl. 1.
34. Anti-Injunction Act, supra note 5.
35. See Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat'l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 853, 856
(9th Cir. 1981) (enjoining defendants from prosecuting a claim in Canada on the grounds that
the Canadian claim must be pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim to plaintiff's claims in United
States court); Terry Kelly, Note, The Power of a Federal District Court to Enjoin an Action,
Grounded on a Compulsory Counterclaim, in the Court of a Foreign Country, 2 CAN.-AM. LJ.
211 (1984) (discussing Seattle Totems case). The court in Seattle Totems relied on the general
choice of law principle stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §122 (1971)
that courts will apply their own rules of procedure to the cases before them, 652 F.2d at 853-54.
36. See, e.g., China Trade, 837 F.2d at 37 (reversing a district court anti-suit injunction
because the possibility that the United States judgment would be unenforceable in Korea was
mere speculation and regardless of this, enforcement of the judgment might require relitigation
in Korea); Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1356 (reversing a
preliminary injunction because Banker Trust's ability to appoint a receiver of its choice for Gau
Shan in Hong Kong court, thereby gaining control of Gau Shan, did not threaten the jurisdiction
of the United States court, merely Gau Shan's interest in prosecuting the lawsuit).
37. See, eg., Gau Shan, 837 F. 2d at 1356; Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 938.
38. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937-45; infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text; China
Trade, 837 F.2d at 35-37; infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text; Mutual Service Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 919,922-23 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (upholding one injunction and
rejecting two others based in part on the interests of the foreign jurisdictions).
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merely contribute to the international confusion surrounding the issue.
For example, in China Trade and Development Corp. v. M.V Choong
Yong, the Second Circuit reversed a District Court's ruling issuing an
anti-foreign suit injunction to enjoin the defendant from prosecuting
a parallel action in its home forum of the Republic of Korea 9 The
Court of Appeals in this case did acknowledge that if a foreign court
were to effectively usurp the United States court's jurisdiction, or the
defendant was seeking to evade its public policies by litigating in a
foreign court, an injunction would be necessary.' However, it did
not find that the Korean litigation, amounting to a suit for negative
declaratory judgment, was sufficiently frustrating to its own proceed-
ings to justify the issuance of an anti-suit injunction.4' Another
District Court reached a substantially similar conclusion based on a
slightly different set of considerations in the recent case of Mutual
Service Casualty Ins. Co. v. Frit Industries, Inc.42 That court focused
on the singular fact that a foreign declaratory judgment allows the
United States to retain the ability to hear the case.43 It did not
consider the actual effects of that foreign declaration on the authority
of a United States judgment abroad.
In contrast to these rationales, foreign declarations of nonliability
affecting United States plaintiffs and ultimately the power of the
United States courts themselves must be viewed from the perspective
of their effects. When analogized to the recognized effects of anti-suit
injunctions, their potential for causing harm becomes clear. Anti-suit
injunctions are correctly understood as
deny[ing] foreign courts the right to exercise their proper jurisdic-
tion.... [and] convey[ing] the message, intended or not, that the
issuing court has so little confidence in the foreign court's ability to
adjudicate a given dispute fairly and efficiently that it is unwilling
even to allow the possibility.4
Although foreign declarations of nonliability do not rob United States
courts of the opportunity to hear and judge a case, they do strip any
resulting judgment of effect in that foreign jurisdiction-the forum in
which the defendant most likely holds his or her assets. The result in
39. 837 F.2d at 34-35, 37.
40. Id at 36-37.
41. Id.
42. 805 F. Supp. at 921-25.
43. See id. at 924-25; see also Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355 (focusing on whether a parallel
action in Hong Kong would threaten the jurisdiction of the United States court or cause the
important policies of the United States court to be evaded).
44. Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355.
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both foreign declarations of nonliability and foreign anti-suit
injunctions involving a United States plaintiff is the stymieing of that
plaintiff's United States suit at one stage in the action.45
Despite the existing judicial disagreement on the importance of
the effects of foreign declarations of nonliability, once successful
plaintiffs attempt to have their judgments enforced, there is no doubt
as to the actual harmful effects of a foreign court's negative declarato-
ry judgment on the viability of a United States judgment. Cases that
arise under these circumstances clearly demonstrate the impotence of
United States judgments abroad if prior domestic declaratory
judgments of nonliability have been issued by a foreign court.46 The
Deutsch v. West Coast Machinery Co. case47 and the parallel suit
filed in Japan for a negative declaratory judgment, Marubeni America
v. Kansai Iron Works,48 provide the best illustration of a United
States judgment's ineffectuality in the foreign court which has issued
a contrary declaration of nonliability. In the United States case,
Deutsch sued West Coast Machinery Company, a Washington
corporation; Marubeni-Iida ("Marubeni America"), a New York
subsidiary of Marubeni-Iida Co., Ltd. in Japan, importer of the
defective power press which caused the injury; and Kansai Iron
Works, Ltd. ("Kansai"), a Japanese corporation which manufactured
the press. 49  Marubeni America filed a cross-claim for indemnifica-
tion against Kansai.50 Kansai attempted to have the cross-claim
45. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909 (upholding District Court's injunction against the
defendants in order to preserve its own jurisdiction, and interpreting the English court's issuance
of a declaratory judgment of nonliability and of anti-suit injunctions as a threat to the United
States court's jurisdiction). The history of the Laker Airways litigation includes the following
cases: Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp 1124 (D.D.C. 1983); British
Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 375 (Q.B.); British Airways Bd. v. Laker
Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 All E.R. 39 (H.L.). For a more extensive description of the sequence of
events in this case, see Bermann, supra note 4, at 591-94; Note, Antisuit Injunctions and
International Comity, 71 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1043-1046 (1985); Court Bars Six Airlines Sued by
Laker from Seeking Relief from Foreign Forums, 18 Int'l Trade Rep., Mar. 22, 1983, no. 24, at
989, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, INTRAD File (quoting Judge Harold Greene that the
British court's acts were a "denigration of American law" and set a "dangerous precedent" with
the potential to affect international trade and friendly foreign relations).
46. See Marubeni America, Inc. v. Kansai Iron Works, 361 Hanta 127 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Dec.
22, 1977), translated in 23 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 200, 206-07 (1980) [hereinafter Kansai Iron
Works]; Laker Airways v. British Airways Board, [1984] 3 All E.R. 39; LakerAirways, 731 F.2d
909.
47. Deutsch v. West Coast Machinery Co., 497 P.2d 1311 (Wash. 1972).
48. Kansai Iron Works, supra note 46.
49. 497 P.2d at 1312-13.
50. Id. at 1313.
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE-SUIT
dismissed, but was denied.5' The parties entered into a settlement
agreement totalling $75,000 in damages for the plaintiff in September
1974. Marubeni America then obtained a Washington State court
judgment for the settlement amount and attorneys' fees from
Kansai.52 Marubeni America attempted to enforce the United States
judgment in Japan because Kansai had no assets in the United States.
However, Kansai had instituted an action and received a declaration
in December 1974 from the Osaka District Court that it had no
obligation to indemnify Marubeni America.53 Although this action
was entered two months after the judgment in the United States for
indemnification was secured, it was made final before Marubeni
America could secure a judgment in Japan for the recognition and
enforcement of its United States judgment. 4
This case demonstrates that United States courts cannot ignore
the international community in which they operate. No positive law
exists in this heretofore little-known area of transnational litigation to
guide United States courts in formulating uniform approaches to their
balancing of issues. The unfortunate result is that far too many cases
demonstrate the courts' unresponsiveness to this subtle, though
effective, legal tactic.
The unpredictability underlying any United States case consider-
ing parallel foreign proceedings is only exacerbated by the fact that
the default opinion in the United States judiciary favors international
comity.5' A hollow United States judgment issued by a United
States court and rendered impotent by a foreign forum neither
preserves the principle of comity, nor protects the power of plaintiffs
or the court.
This disempowering of the plaintiff's suit seems contrary to the
interpretation consistently given to Article III as restricting federal
51. Id. at 1318.
52. Fujita, supra note 7, at 197.
53. Kansai Iron Works, supra note 46, at 206-07.
54. Id. at 202-03, 206-07.
55. Where United States courts are satisfied that foreign proceedings appear to have been
conducted in a fair manner, they will not usually admit fact or law to be relitigated in
enforcement proceedings and will ordinarily grant recognition and enforce the foreign judgment
due to comity. See, eg., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,440-
41, 444 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (recognizing and enforcing an English
judgment without allowing defendants to dispute the law or facts of the case where defendants
had refused to appear before the English court with valid jurisdiction which had issued the
default judgment).
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courts from deciding cases when their judgments will not be execut-
ed.55 A court in these cases is effectively only offering an opinion,
not a conclusive resolution.57 There are some exceptions to this
judicial rule of self-restraint,58 however, "the ordinary course of
judicial procedure results in a judgment requiring an award of process
or execution to carry it into effect."59
In addition, United States courts remain hampered by a paucity
of guidance from the legislative and executive branches. These
factors combine to form a situation ripe for abuse of judiciaries like
United States courts when potential litigants become aware of the
possibilities for evasion.
C. Ineffective United States Judicial Tools
Currently, United States courts follow no uniformly accepted
course when a case arises posing these international complexities.
Courts tend to favor the principles espoused under comity: to refrain
from actions which would affect courts of other jurisdictions.'
However, where a United States court is motivated to address these
international problems, it generally has two broad policy options: the
anti-foreign suit injunction or the lis pendens doctrine.
1. The Anti-Suit Injunction. Courts have historically em-
ployed the anti-suit injunction as a tool of last resort to protect their
own jurisdiction and the claims of their litigants against foreign legal
actions like declarations of nonliability.61 This tactic is invasive, but
has nevertheless been employed to prevent the frustration of the
forum's public policy, vexatious litigation, removal of a court's
jurisdiction, or an offensive outcome.62 As potent instruments of the
56. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-241 (1937).
57. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
58. These exceptions include boundary disputes, naturalization proceedings, suits de-
termining matrimonial or other status, and similar suits which do not require damage payments
or performance of specific acts. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S.
249, 263 (1933).
59. Id.
60. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
61. See Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927; see also Note,
supra note 45, at 1047-49, 1051.
62. See, Unterweser Reederei & GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1970) aff'd on
rehearing en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), vacated on other grounds sub nom;
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495,498 (5th
Cir. 1971) (affirming the issuance of an anti-suit injunction to restrain party from pursuing an
action in the Bahamas because it would pose a hardship of expense and vexatious foreign
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destruction of international comity, however, the use of anti-suit
injunctions is cautioned against even in situations satisfying these
criteria.63
Motions for anti-suit injunctions are granted most frequently
when "an action is pending in one court and the defendant seeks, or
the plaintiff fears the defendant will seek, declaratory relief on the
same issues against the plaintiff in a second forum."'  Injunctions
issued in these cases are largely defensive measures and are directed
against private litigants, not foreign courts. However, serious conflicts
arise out of their issuance nonetheless because they effectively curtail
a foreign court's jurisdiction in the process.'
Although international anti-suit injunctions have been deemed
necessary in certain limited and highly offensive situations' such as
when a foreign court obstructs a court's jurisdiction, their use and
inherent characteristics render them flawed tools of equity.' Anti-
suit injunctions necessarily impinge upon the principles of internation-
al comity which are crucial to successful international relations.'
These injunctions, while issued in personam, directly compromise "the
comity which the federal courts owe to courts of other jurisdic-
tions, '  and can be interpreted as judicial overreaching.' Due to
the delicate nature of the injunction, United States courts have
attempted to equate the balance of comity and equity according to the
facts of the case presented and each court's own view of the proper
result.
Concurrent foreign proceedings involving the same issues and
parties are not themselves offensive enough to cause a United States
litigation on the plaintiff). Cf. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 285 F.2d 542,545 (7th Cir.
1960) (refusing to uphold an injunction against prosecuting a foreign case because the United
States case would not dispose of the issues to be litigated in the foreign action and the foreign
litigation was neither vexatious nor harassing).
63. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 213. For a more recent court opinion recognizing this call
for judicial restraint, see Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349,1354 (6th Cir.
1992).
64. Note, supra note 45, at 1041; see e.g., Laker Airways Ltd., v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (enjoining defendant from commencing suit in England);
Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982) (enjoining
defendant from proceeding with parallel suit in England).
65. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927.
66. See id
67. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 589-90.
68. Id. at 590.
69. Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577,578 (1st Cir. 1969).
70. See, eg., id at 579 (vacating a district court's summary injunction of a Canadian suit
involving a separate, independent foreign patent right).
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court to issue an anti-suit injunction.7 ' Beyond this basic premise,
United States courts also generally agree that factors such as
convenience are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to justify
breaching international comity.72 When courts do grant requests for
international anti-suit injunctions, their concern largely centers around
"the belief that the [foreign] proceedings have as their purpose and
will have as their probable effect interference with the local court's
own prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction."'73
Broad criteria for United States courts considering the balance of
comity and equity in determining whether anti-suit injunctions are
warranted have included the following: whether the parties and issues
would be the same in both actions,74 whether the conclusion of the
United States action will terminate the controversy, 5 whether the
foreign proceedings would "frustrate" a public policy of the enjoining
forum,76 whether the foreign action will be "vexatious" or "oppres-
sive, '77 whether the parallel suit would affect the issuing court's
jurisdiction, 78 and whether the foreign action would prejudice other
equitable concerns.79 However, even when courts employ similar
criteria, they have inevitably arrived at different, and thus, inequitable
results.
Cases that involve conflicts between United States federal and
state jurisdictions are governed by specific legislation in the Anti-
Injunction Statute.' This legislation provides some guidance for the
use of anti-suit injunctions in cases involving foreign litigants,
although Congress has not spoken on the power of federal courts to
enjoin parties from initiating or participating in foreign proceed-
71. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 928 (finding that hardship to litigants and the
economics of consolidated suits are issues for a forum non conveniens motion rather than an
anti-suit injunction).
73. Bermann, supra note 4, at 623.
74. See Western Elec. Co., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 450 F. Supp. 835,837 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
appeal dismissed, 568 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1978).
75. See id.





80. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978) (denying Article III courts the equitable power to issue in-
junctions to stay state court proceedings unless specifically authorized by federal legislation or
in order to protect its jurisdiction or judgments).
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ings.8" Principles of comity loom behind every court decision with
international implications, but these principles are assigned varying
weight and used in different ways by each court.
In England, anti-suit injunctions are subject to a comparable
restraint necessitating that "an injunction will only be granted where
the ends of justice so require."'  However, where the anti-foreign
suit injunction is employed, as in the Laker Airways litigation, "[i]t is
remarkable that almost all of the modern decisions in England on the
exercise of this power concern proceedings in the United States."'
One British legal scholar describes the United States-British jurisdic-
tional tension as rooted in differences between the methods of each
system.84
One of the fundamental problems creating tensions between
forums is a foreign perception of the United States legal system as
one in which a plaintiff can sue for a claim without having to
relinquish more than contingent fees and with the expectation of great
rewards.' The wide divergence in laws in areas such as antitrust and
in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction between countries such
as the United Kingdom and the United States also contribute to an
undercurrent of animosity pervading many cases where these courts
have concurrent parallel jurisdiction.' While this subtle hostility is
clearly present, courts often feel pressure to preface their judicial acts
with conciliatory remarks where these actions, "however disguised and
indirect," effectively interfere with foreign judicial proceedings.'
Lord Donaldson of the English Court of Appeal engaged in such
fraternal friendliness in one of the Laker Airways cases:
[N]either the English courts nor the English judges entertain any
feelings of hostility towards the American antitrust laws or would
ever wish to denigrate that or any other American law. Judicial
comity is shorthand for good neighbourliness, common courtesy and
mutual respect between those who labour in adjoining judicial
vineyards. In the context of the United Kingdom and the United
81. See Seattle Totems Hockey Club., 652 F.2d at 855 n.5.
82. Soc. Nat. Industrielle A6rospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak, [1987] App. Cas. 871, 895-96 (P.C.),
[1987] 3 All E.R. 510, 522 (P.C.).
83. Lawrence Collins, Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation, in
ACADAMIE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 1992-III: COLLECTED COURSES
OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 140 (1993).
84. See id. at 140-41.
85. See British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1983] 3 All E.R. 375, 409 (Q.B.).
86. See Note, supra note 45, at 1046.
87. Collins, supra note 83, at 149 (quoting British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd. [1985]
AC 58, 95.
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States, this comes naturally and, so far as we are concerned,
effortlessly.'
Where anti-suit injunctions are considered ultimately necessary,
the potential ramifications lie not only in judicial repercussions, but
even in political retaliation. The Laker Airways litigation is a
dramatic example of the extent to which international politics can be
intertwined with judicial action through the thread of international
comity.89 The litigation began when the plaintiff company was
forced into liquidation by what it claimed was a price competition
conspiracy involving other airlines." A series of conflicting actions
issued by English and United States courts initiated a flurry of
motions which transformed this litigation into a now infamous
confusion of declaratory judgments and injunctions issued from one
sovereign court to the next. The effect was that all notions of
international comity were ignored and potential relief for the plaintiff
from some foreign defendants was denied.91
Because of their potential for causing problems in international
politics, anti-foreign suit injunctions have been avoided at all costs in
the United States since the creation of the United States judicial
system. As noted in 1849, "[t]he fact ... that an injunction issues
only to the parties before the court, and not to the court, is no
evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt
to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another and
independent forum."'  British courts have also noted the under-
standing that jurisdiction must be exercised cautiously in these cases
because "it involves interference with the process of the foreign court
concerned."' '93
Foreign courts are not entirely without remedy if an anti-suit
injunction is issued. They are under no international obligation to
recognize a foreign injunction, although they may do so voluntarily
out of respect for international comity.94 The doctrine of comity is
pervasive in United States courts, but where strong United States
88. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., 1984 Q.B. 142, 185-86 (English C.A.).
89. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 608 n.75.
90. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 916-17.
91. See Court Bars Six Airlines Sued by Laker from Seeking Relief From Foreign Forums,
supra note 45.
92. Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849).
93. Collins, supra note 83, at 141 (quoting South Carolina Insurance Co. v. "De Zeven
Provincien N.y." [1987] AC 14, 40 (per Lord Brandon)).
94. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 607 ("the anti-suit injunction has its own weaknesses-
notably the ease with which it can be ignored by the court to which it is directed").
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public policies are affected by foreign anti-suit injunctions, courts are
unlikely to recognize or enforce these equitable orders.95 Any
foreign court order which prevents the commencement or continuance
of a suit in United States courts aims to deprive United States courts
of valid, concurrent jurisdiction. In United States courts, as is likely
in most foreign forums, this type of offensive order could arguably
"be deemed prima facie contrary to public policy."96 A legitimate
violation of an important public policy of a forum is generally
sufficient to outweigh interests in preserving international comity;
hence, that preemptive foreign order would not be recognized or
enforced in the court asked to enforce it.'
A final problem with the anti-suit injunction is that courts may
counter anti-suit injunctions granted by courts of a different sovereign
by ordering anti-anti-suit injunctions. These orders may be issued to
prevent a litigant from obtaining an anti-suit injunction from a foreign
court as against a party pursuing litigation in the issuing court or
to prevent the enforcement of the original anti-suit injunction itself.'
This counter-suit maneuver can cause a spate of judicial orders
in equity, resulting in "unfettered chaos brought about by unresolv-
able conflicts of jurisdiction the world over."'' "0 District Judge
Harold Greene's opinion in one of the suite of Laker Airways cases
clearly voices the offensive effects of these injunctions: "The Court
exceedingly regrets that it must issue an injunction in this case.
However ... [t]he lawsuit pending before it was proceeding in its
normal course,.., when the British court, without appropriate regard
to principles of comity, proceeded to interfere with that action."'0 '
95. Note, supra note 45, at 1054 (discussing obligations of United States courts); see also
Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 938 (British anti-suit injunction enjoining plaintiff's action in the
United States conflicts with United States public policy, rendering the injunction unenforceable).
96. Note, supra note 45, at 1067.
97. See Nanus Asia Co. Inc. v. Standard Chartered Bank, [1990] 1 H.K. L.REP. 396,405-06
(High Ct. 1988) (refusing to recognize a United States anti-suit injunction because the Hong
Kong court denied the validity of the injunction's extraterritorial effects in Hong Kong).
98. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 930-31. The court reasoned that it
was threatened with a potential fait accompli by the appellants which would have
virtually eliminated the court's effective jurisdiction over Laker's facially valid claim.
... Thus, there was nothing improper in the district court's decision to enjoin
appellants from seeking to participate in the English proceedings solely designed to rob
the court of its jurisdiction.
lit
99. BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 23, at 341.
100. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 941.
101. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124,1138 (D.D.C. 1983),
affd sub. nom Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
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There is a real potential for parties to be caught in the middle of
resultant "interjurisdictional judicial warfare"'" without a legal
remedy. 3 Inherent in the very nature of an anti-suit injunction is
the potential for foreclosure of suits in courts with valid jurisdiction,
"[f]or if one may enjoin, the other may retort by injunction, and thus
the parties be without remedy; being liable to a process for contempt
in one, if they dare to proceed in the other."' °4 As in Laker Air-
ways, plaintiffs' rights and the court's jurisdiction can be neutralized.
Defendants can be sheltered from legitimate legal complaints in the
crossfire of often reactionary foreign judicial orders.' 5
Thus, anti-suit injunctions are not an adequate remedy to the
problems posed by foreign negative declaratory judgments in double-
suit litigation. As equitable tools without clear instructions for their
application, judicial actions which inherently constitute a breach of
comity, and invitations to "in kind" retaliations by other forums, they
are highly suspect in their effect. This conclusion is buttressed by the
fact that the anti-suit injunctions' sacrifice of comity and inequality of
application may have no real benefit because the injunctions lack the
international authority necessary to demand recognition and enforce-
ment. The potential costs to litigants and courts involved could even
prove to be greater than those of the double-suit litigation itself.
2. The Lis Pendens Doctrine. The judicial doctrine of lis
pendens advocates a positive action of restraint so that courts with
valid concurrent jurisdiction do not try the same cases. The theory
behind lis pendens was stated in Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp."°6
in 1942:
"In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has
possession of the subject must decide it." . .. It is of obvious
importance to all the litigants to have a single determination of
their controversy, rather than several decisions which if they
conflict may require separate appeals to different circuit courts of
appeals.10
1984).
102. Bermann, supra note 4, at 631.
103. Note, supra note 45, at 1048.
104. See Peck, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 625.
105. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 930-31.
106. 122 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942).
107. Id. at 929-30 (quoting Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532, 535 (1824) (Marshall,
Ci.)).
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The courts have a long-held interest in avoiding vexatious and
duplicitous litigation for the sake of the parties involved. United
States jurisprudence also emphasizes the policies of avoiding economic
waste, promoting judicial efficiency, and upholding the notions of
comity and final resolution.0 8 These concepts are incorporated
internationally into the doctrine of lis pendens in two ways: (1) the
"first-filed" rule espouses an affirmative action by a court in which the
proceedings were first filed to enjoin the same proceedings in another
court; and (2) the "first-seised" rule advocates a passive stay action of
proceedings by any court other than the one which was first seised of
the action.0 9 The judgment from the first court is then applied as
res judicata to the second action."0
a. First-Filed Rule. Lis pendens has not been applied with
regularity by United States courts concerned with similar and
concurrent foreign suits. However, where it is utilized by United
States courts, it most frequently takes the form of an affirmative
injunction of foreign proceedings."' Sometimes courts utilize the
theory of lis pendens to bolster their justification for injunctions
against other actions which were in fact filed first: these second courts
are unwilling to accept the fact that a prior filing in a foreign court
necessitates the second court's automatic stay of exercise of its
jurisdiction."' Whether or not the court was the one in which the
action was first filed, the court makes the decision to issue an
injunction after inquiries into the degree of inconvenience, inefficien-
cy, complexity, and delay which would be caused if the court
maintained its concurrent jurisdiction."3
One of the early United States cases that specifically employed
the first-filed doctrine is Crosley."a The litigation involved a string
of suits, including declaratory judgments of nonliability, filed by each
party in two different United States District Courts."' The Court
108. See id at 930.
109. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 610.
110. Id. at 609-10.
111. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 956 (affirming district court's issuance of a preliminary
injunction restraining foreign defendants from participating in foreign actions which would
prevent the district court from hearing Laker's claims); see also Bermann, supra note 4, at 610-
11.
112. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 610-11; see, eg., Canadian Filters, 412 F.2d at 578.
113. See Bermann, supra note 4, at 611.
114. 122 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1941).
115. Id. at 926-27.
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of Appeals held that in the case of two equal courts, under the same
sovereign, which are faced with the same parties and issues, and
where the jurisdiction of one court was invoked prior to that of
another, the first court abused its discretion if it refused to grant an
injunction to prevent or halt the other proceedings.11 6 It concluded
that as between "courts of equal dignity within the judicial system of
a single sovereignty[,] ... [t]he party who first brings a controversy
into a court of competent jurisdiction for adjudication should... be
free from the vexation of subsequent litigation over the same subject
matter.""' The court cited obvious economic waste, negative effects
on the prompt and efficient administration of justice, and public
policy as contributing factors to its ultimate decision."1 The same
tactic has been taken in other United States cases and is an estab-
lished application of the first-filed rule in United States courts."9
The affirmative first-filed rule enumerated by the Crosley
decision and applied there in the case of two equal courts under the
same sovereign was extended by Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. to a case involving two equal courts under different
sovereigns.120 The court in Cargill found that it had concurrent,
parallel jurisdiction with an English court hearing a case involving the
same parties and issues. The United States District Court adopted
the aggressive position of the principle of first-filing. It issued an anti-
suit injunction against the defendant to prevent its pursuit of legal
actions in the English court which had received initiation motions the
same day as had the United States court.'2' The Cargill court
concluded that parallel proceedings in this case would be so inconve-
nient and so likely to lead to inconsistent results that restraint of the
foreign court's exercise of jurisdiction was necessary.'2 The court
stated that a "federal court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
control its own proceedings by enjoining parties from bringing
proceedings in other courts, including courts of foreign jurisdictions,
although this power should be used sparingly."" The English
action appeared to be a 'pre-emptive strike' against the United States
116. Id. at 927, 929.
117. Id. at 929-30.
118. Id. at 930.
119. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 651 F.2d at 887 n.10 (quoting Triangle Conduit &
Cable Co., Inc. v. Nat' Elec. Prod. Corp., 125 F.2d 1008, 1009 (3d Cir. 1942)).
120. See 531 F. Supp. 710, 713-15 (D. Minn. 1982).




court action, and this latter justification likely caused the court little
hesitation in issuing the anti-suit injunction.24 Cargill enumerated
criteria for the issuance of an injunction against foreign actions and
concluded that when a United States court has first acquired
jurisdiction over the issues and parties, "[a]n injunction is in order
when adjudication of the same issue in two separate actions will result
in unnecessary delay, substantial inconvenience and expense to the
parties and witnesses, and where separate adjudications could result
in inconsistent rulings or a race to judgment."'" These factors are
substantially similar to those applied in Crosley for injunctions issued
by and to restrain courts of the same sovereign. 26
b. First-Seised Rule. The first-seised rule is the jurisprudential
mirror image of the affirmative first-filed rule. It is a more passive
approach, and is most clearly advanced by the European Community's
(EC) Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention).27 One of the
main purposes behind the Brussels Convention is the elimination of
concurrent parallel proceedings on the same dispute in different
signatory countries.'2
The Brussels Convention describes which member state has
jurisdiction over certain disputes. In Article 21 it mandates that
"[w]here proceedings involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties are brought in the courts of different Contracting
States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own
motion decline jurisdiction in favour of that court."' 29 Where the
actions are nearly related, the second court has the discretion to
dismiss. 3° If there is a question as to the jurisdiction of the court
which was first seised of the dispute, other courts may stay their
proceedings until the question is resolved. A court wherein an action
124. Trevor C. Hartley, Comity and the Use ofAntisuit Injunctions in International Litigation,
35 AM. J. COMp. L. 487, 500 (1987). See also Bethell, 441 F.2d at 498 (quoting EHRENZWEIG,
CONFLICrs OF LAW 129-30 (1962)).
125. Cargill 531 F.Supp at 715.
126. See Crosley, 122 F. 2d at 930.
127. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, arts. 21-23, 1978 OJ. (L 304) 36, 40 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
128. Westin & Chrocziel, supra note 6, at 738.
129. Brussels Convention, supra note 127, art. 21, at 40 (emphasis added).
130. Bermann, supra note 4, at 610 n.81.
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is first filed has the ability to determine its own jurisdictional compe-
tence under its own laws.'
3
'
Articles 21 and 22 of the Brussels Convention, therefore, only
mandate that member state courts defer to other member courts in a
passive lis pendens manner; the Brussels Convention does not grant
these courts the power to invoke affirmative actions to halt parallel
proceedings. 32 The scope of these articles is limited as well. Where
the court first seized is not in a member state, a member state with a
parallel proceeding is not required to abide by the Brussels Conven-
tion in relation to that proceeding.' Also, within the same con-
tracting state, any priority is determined by national law."'4 Where
a noncontracting state and a contracting state are involved, national
law and any applicable bilateral convention will determine if any
priority exists to require or recommend a stay or dismissal of one
case. 35 These provisions of the Brussels Convention are functional-
ly effective because they operate within the superstructure of the
union. The members are bound together legally, economically, and
politically by a complex web of reciprocal and uniform obligations,
creating the solidarity that gives the Brussels Convention a workable
foundation. 6
United States courts have been reluctant to follow this passive
rule in situations where they have decided concurrent parallel suits
are unacceptable. An exception to this jurisprudential trend is
Robinson v. Royal Bank of Canada.'37 In this case, the Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeals overturned the Circuit Court's denial of a grant
of stay of the United States proceedings. The Florida Circuit Court
131. Westin & Chrocziel, supra note 6, at 738 n.57. See Case 129/83 Zelger v. Salinitri, 1984
E.C.R. 2397,2408 (holding that the application of national law is appropriate to determine the
point of seizure of a court for the purposes of Article 21).
132. Westin & Chrocziel, supra note 6, at 738.
133. See Reflections on a General Convention, supra note 12, at 8-10 (describing that no EU
country has assumed a duty towards any non-party nation to not recognize or enforce judicial
decisions given in another Contracting state against defendants domiciled in the non-party
nation).
134. See STEPHEN O'MALLEY & ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE 634
(1989).
135. See id. at 634-35.
136. See D. LASOK & P.A. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 436-
37 (1987).
137. 462 So.2d 101, 102 (1985). For other exceptions see Saemann v. Everest & Jennings,
Int'l, 343 F.Supp. 457,461 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (refusal to grant injunction against defendant's pursuit
of concurrent suit in England and stay of United States proceedings pending outcome of the
litigation in England); and Canadian Filters, 412 F.2d at 578-79 (1st Cir. 1969) (vacating district
court's grant of injunction concerning Canadian patent suit on the principle of comity).
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE-SUIT
shared concurrent jurisdiction with a Canadian court in a nearly
identical suit which had been filed first in Canada.'38 The Florida
District Court of Appeals reasoned that comity counseled that the
Circuit Court ought to have declined jurisdiction: "[a] grant of stay is
appropriate where two actions are pending simultaneously which
involve the same parties and substantially the same causes of
action."'39
Robinson is thus one of a few exceptions to United States judicial
action in this area. Largely because lis pendens is a purely voluntary
and discretionary doctrine in the United States, domestic courts have
not often opted to allow foreign proceedings to suffice when they also
have valid concurrent jurisdiction and where United States laws are
to be applied. United States laws in the area of antitrust, for
example, are unique to our judicial system and will not be enforced
if the United States courts stay their jurisdiction in favor of a foreign
proceeding applying foreign laws."
The lis pendens doctrine, like the anti-suit injunction, fails to
address all the risks to United States litigants and courts when foreign
declarations of nonliability are issued. Within the confines of the
trading community of the EU, the doctrine espoused in the Brussels
Convention may well work.' 4' However, the United States does not
share full faith and credit obligations with any other sovereign nation,
its domestic laws are not in any way deliberately harmonized to more
closely match those of other nations, and there exists no supra-
national tribunal reigning supreme over both United States and
foreign interpretations of procedure.
Both affirmative and passive lis pendens approaches each have
their problems: the former due to the breach of comity which is ne-
cessitated by its issuance; the latter due to its unsuitability for the
judiciary's purpose of upholding and applying United States laws
where applicable. Additionally, they both create dilemmas as courts
and litigants must guess what action foreign courts or other parties
will take to harm a lawsuit. Ultimately, both litigants and United
138. Robinson, 462 So. 2d at 102.
139. Id.
140. See British Airways v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. 375,393-95 (denying injunction
against antitrust suit in United States District Court because of the uniqueness of United States
antitrust laws); British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 All E.R. 39,40 (reaffirming
the denial of an injunction in British Airways v. Laker Airways because the suit was not
unconscionable).
141. See Reflections on a General Convention, supra note 12, at 8-10.
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States laws suffer because the United States courts do not issue
preemptive anti-foreign suit injunctions or litigants do not win the
race to the courthouse.
Thus, in United States judicial proceedings where a concurrent,
parallel action is taking place in a foreign forum, United States courts
must rely on general notions of comity for instruction in dealing with
international issues. As a result, United States courts usually allow
those foreign parallel actions to preempt United States judicial
decisions. The courts often do this without closely examining the
effects of a negative declaration of liability on their own powers. The
current United States judicial treatment has -been described as a
confusing approach in which procedural and substantive standards are
not similar to those of other countries, uniformity is absent among the
states, and inconsistent interpretations of common law doctrines by
the various courts abound. 42 As a consequence of this confusion,
courts' judgments are rendered impotent by contrary foreign
judgments and plaintiffs' claims are not relieved with adequate
compensation. Solutions to the judicial dilemma created by interna-
tional double-suits must be sought, and changes must be pursued not
only unilaterally within the United States judicial system, but
multilaterally among other foreign judicial systems in order to develop
a mutual understanding of procedure and effect.
III. THE BRUSSELS CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Prior to their accession to the Brussels Convention, the common
law in both Ireland and the United Kingdom provided that foreign
judgments would act as the basis for their own domestic proceedings
if their courts found that the foreign issuing court had proper
jurisdiction over the case'. The United Kingdom had also relied
on its Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933...
which provided that "a foreign judgment to which a convention
concluded by the UK on the mutual recognition and enforcement of
142. See David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in
the United States, West Germany, and England, 19 LAW AND POL'Y INT'L Bus., 325,360 (1987).
143. See Reflections on a General Convention, supra note 12, at 2-4.
144. See PETER BYRNE, THE EEC CONVENTION ONJURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS 2 (1990).
145. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, pt. I, §§I(I), 1(3), reprinted in
2 HORACE E. REED, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 316-17 app.
B (1938).
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judgments applied could be enforced simply by registration with the
appropriate court" of England, Wales, Scotland, or Northern
Ireland.'"
Finally, they acceded to the European Community's (EC's)
Convention of September 27, 1968, on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels
Convention), 47 which governed the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in the EC member states.'48 The Brussels
Convention, Article 55, provides that the Convention will supersede
the conventions thereafter listed in that article with respect to the
signatory states.149  As amended after the 1978 Accession Conven-
tion, Article 55 includes in its list of superseded treaties those of the
United Kingdom which came under the 1933 Foreign Judgments
Act.150
146. BYRNE, supra note 144, at 3. The United Kingdom had concluded treaties to which this
Act applied with France (signed in Paris, January 18, 1934); Belgium (signed in Brussels, May
2, 1934); the Federal Republic of Germany (signed in Bonn, July 14, 1960); Italy (signed in
Rome, February 7, 1964, with amending Protocol signed in Rome, July 14, 1970); and the
Netherlands (signed at the Hague, November 17, 1967). BYRNE, supra note 144, at 3, 171-172.
See also O'MALLEY & LAYTON, supra note 134, at 246-47 (discussing the course of legal
proceedings in England and Wales, but noting that the application of the 1933 Act to any of the
Contracting States-including all of the nations listed above--of the 1968 Brussels Convention
is extremely limited).
147. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom acceded to the Brussels Convention, supra
note 127, in the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on Its
Interpretation by the Court of Justice, 1978 OJ. (L 304) 1 [hereinafter Accession Convention].
The Brussels Convention entered into force in the United Kingdom on January 1, 1987, and in
Ireland on June 1, 1988. See BYRNE, supra note 144, at ix. Separate, later accession
conventions were signed by Greece, Spain, and Portugal. See id. at x, 216-18. A parallel
convention was signed by the EC member states and the member states of the European Free
Trade Association (EFrA)-Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland-on
September 16,1988. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1980 OJ. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention]; BYRNE, supra note
144, at 8. While differences exist between the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention,
the ultimate goal of the Lugano Convention is to provide uniformity between all signatory states.
See icL The Lugano Convention is open to accession by third states. Id
148. See Editions Francis Lefebvre, Mdmento Pratique, CEE 1991: Juridique Fiscal, Douane,
Social, Comptable, at 114-118 (Reconnaissance et exrcution des dcisions) (1991).
149. Brussels Convention, supra note 127, art. 55 at 44 (Article 55 is subject to limiting
provisions in Articles 54 and 56).
150. Accession Convention, supra note 147, art. 24 at 8 (assuming a misprint in which the
Convention mistakenly substitutes "Republic of Italy" for "Federal Republic of Germany" with
respect to the treaty signed in Bonn, July 14, 1960). For a description of the implementing
process and application of EC laws to Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and
England, see INSTITUT EUROPtEN D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE, L'APPLICATION DU DROIT
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More specifically, Articles 25-51 deal broadly with this issue and
Article 26 establishes a "full faith and credit"-like recognition
provision which operates exclusively between member states.151
Article 27 enumerates criteria for denying recognition of a judg-
ment.1
52
Similarly open enforcement procedures exist between the
member states. Article 31 states that "[a] judgment given in a
Contracting State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in
another Contracting State when, on the application of any interested
party, the order for its enforcement has been issued there. 15 3
However, these favorable intra-EU provisions in the Brussels Conven-
tion and similar European Free Trade Association (EFTA) provisions
in the Lugano Convention" do not in any way open those states to
more ready recognition or enforcement of United States judgments.
The EU formulated its approach for the Brussels Convention
with many goals in mind. 5  While it would appear logical for this
federation of states to look to other federal structures such as the
United States for guidance in its approach, in fact the contrary proved
true. The EU found little in the American federal system to use as
a model:
[T]he absence of any substantial federal control over choice of law,
coupled with the variety of approaches to the matter which may be
adopted by State courts, [and] the ease with which judicial
jurisdiction may be established ... have given rise to a situation in
which there is widespread uncertainty, unpredictability, and scope
for manipulation.'56
COMMUNAUTAIRE PAR LES ETATS MEMBRES 15-101 (1985).
151. See Brussels Convention, supra note 127, arts. 25-51 at 40-43; JOSEPH M. LOOKOFsKY,
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL ARBrrATION 30 (1992).
152. Brussels Convention, supra note 127, art. 27 at 41.
A judgment shall not be recognized:
1. if such recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is
sought;
2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not duly served
3. if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the
same parties in the State in which recognition is sought....
Id.
Article 27 of the Brussels Convention is comparable to provisions of other nations on the subject
of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See, eg. Code of Civ. Procedure Japan,
2 EHS Law Bulletin Series: Japan (Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc.) art. 200, at LA-41 (1992).
153. Brussels Convention, supra note 127, art. 31 at 41.
154. See Lugano Convention, supra note 147, arts. 25-51 at 15-20.
155. See supra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
156. LAsOK & STONE, supra note 136, at 142.
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE-SUIT
The United States might instead do well to study the European plan
as a model. The Brussels Convention has thus far proved to be a
highly workable model, bringing predictability to the judicial process
between the EU member states.1,57
The first goal listed in the Preamble to the Brussels Convention
asserts the parties' desire to implement Article 220 of the Treaty of
Rome.158 Thus the parties worked to achieve "reciprocal recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and of
arbitration awards."' 159
The Brussels Convention, although concluded pursuant to Article
220 of the Treaty of Rome,"6 extends far beyond its intended scope.
The Convention specifies provisions regarding subjects such as
jurisdiction, 6' determinations of domicile, 62 and its relationship
to other conventions. 63 Regarding recognition and enforcement of
judicial judgments, Title III"6 of the Brussels Convention does "not
merely simplify formalities, but define[s] the substantive conditions of,
and regulate[s] in detail the procedure for obtaining, recognition and
enforcement.', 165  Recognition of judgments between the member
states is presumed, unless one of a few limited situations exists, such
as a violation of the public policy of that enforcing forum, a lack of
due process and timely service, or an irreconcilability with another
judgment in a dispute between the same parties in the enforcing
forum. 66 If the judgment is enforceable in the originating state, it
is enforceable (if recognizable) in the other state.'67  Specific
enforcement procedures are elaborated in Title III as well.' 6'
157. See Preliminary Document No. 19 for the Attention of the Seventeenth Session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting
on Enforcement of Judgments 5 (Nov. 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Conclusions on
Enforcement of Judgments].
158. Brussels Convention, supra note 127, pmbl. at 36.
159. Treaty Establishing The European Economic Community [EC Treaty], art. 220.
160. Id.
161. See Brussels Convention, supra note 127, arts. 2-24 at 37-40.
162. See id., arts. 52-53 at 44. The Brussels Convention asserts domicile as the primary basis
for establishing jurisdiction. Id, art. 2 at 37.
163. See id., arts. 55-59 at 44-45.
164. See id., arts. 25-49 at 40-43.
165. LASOK & STONE, supra note 136, at 151.
166. See Brussels Convention, supra note 127, arts. 26-30 at 41; see supra text accompanying
notes 151-152.
167. See Brussels Convention, supra note 127, art. 31 at 41.
168. See id. arts. 31-49 at 41-43. For a detailed analysis of Title III of the Brussels
Convention, see LASOK & STONE, supra note 136, at 287-324.
1994]
390 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:363
Mere recognition without enforcement may be obtained
according to Article 26 without any additional proceedings.169 This
article is easily comparable to the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution,17 and forms the fulcrum of the EU
judicial recognition approach between member states. Article 26 thus
guarantees individuals and businesses that, within the EU, "uniformity
of substantive and procedural rules and a tribunal recognized as
supreme in the interpretation of those rules" provides a degree of
safety and predictability not found between the United States and
other nations.
The provisions of the Brussels Convention demonstrate that the
EC appreciated that
"a true internal market between [the Member States] will be
achieved only if adequate legal protection can be secured ...
[S]ince the effect of judicial acts is confined to each national
territory, legal protection and, hence, legal certainty in the common
market are essentially dependent on the adoption by the Member
States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and
enforcement of judgments."'"
The Brussels Convention has facilitated free trade between its
member states by enabling free recognition and enforcement of
judicial judgments within the block. The members recognize the
value of uniform policies for giving effect to judgments and for
allowing other states to continue with suits filed first in their
jurisdictions. Potential litigants are thus reassured that doing business
in these states offers predictability and certainty of enforcement not
found in most other nations, and are therefore encouraged to
engage in transactions within the Community.
169. Brussels Convention, supra note 127, art. 26 at 41. "A judgment given in a Contracting
State shall be recognized in the other Contracting States without any special procedure being
required." Id.
170. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, §1.
171. Westin, supra note 142, at 359-60.
172. Council Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 03. (C 59) 1, 3 (quoting a European Economic
Community Commission note of October 22, 1959, inviting member states to commence
negotiations on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitration awards).
173. See Conclusions on Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 157, at 3-5 ("With rapidly
expanding commercial contacts worldwide, the legal uncertainty, delays and costs caused by the
absence of a general enforcement of judgments convention are likely to interfere increasingly
with the needs of trade and business... . [A convention like the Brussels and Lugano
conventions] provides more information and predictability").
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In contrast to the Brussels Convention member states, the United
States falls easily into the category of other nations that have far less
certainty in legal processes when the litigation involves a foreign
party. Thus, the framework for "[t]he most serious legal problem" in
United States transnational litigation is established: there is no
guarantee that United States judgments will be recognized or enforced
abroad. 74 This dilemma is in large part due to the fact that the
United States is not a party to any multinational convention, such as
the Brussels Convention, which ensures judicial enforcement and
recognition of foreign judgments as well as regulation of parallel
suits. 17
5
Customary international law in this area has traditionally been
interpreted by United States courts to recommend reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments when certain basic
principles of due process are met and recognition would not violate
public policy.176 These voluntary and discretionary international
principles are no longer enough to protect plaintiffs in United States
courts. The United States needs to take steps to secure a stronger
position internationally, following the paths of other major trading
nations like those in the EU and EFTA, which have firmly committed
themselves to a conclusive resolution through binding treaty obliga-
tions.
The Brussels Convention has exacerbated the preexisting
double-suit dilemma for United States plaintiffs. A judgment issued
174. See Thomas S. Mackey, Litigation Involving Damages to U.S. Plaintiffs Caused by
Private Corporate Japanese Defendants, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW 131, 172 (1992) (describing this
legal dilemma in the exclusive terms of Japanese-United States transnational legal interaction).
175. Although the United States has not become party to a multinational convention on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, it has signed the 1958 Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517,
2566 [hereinafter New York Convention] (entered into force with respect to the United States
of America Dec. 29, 1970) (binding nations to recognize and enforce commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to create uniform standards by which agreements to
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the member states). The New York
Convention binds over eighty nations. Reflections on a General Convention, supra note 12, at
4. Congress has passed the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, implementing
this Convention and the United States has acceded to the Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336, 338 (binding regional
members to recognize and enforce international arbitration clauses and awards between member
states of the Organization of American States and any other state which accedes to the
Convention).
176. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03, 205-06 (1895) (stating the broad guidelines
that United States courts apply at their discretion to determine whether a foreign judgment or
award will be recognized or enforced); see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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by one of the convention's signatories which would preempt a United
States judgment will now be enforced automatically by all the other
signatories."7 7 This sweeping consequence has the potential to
preclude recognition or enforcement of that United States judgment
throughout all the Brussels Convention member states. 178  The
United States must create a judicial system as effective as that of its
trading partners, so that its litigants are not shut out of multinational
groups of nations when they seek recognition and enforcement
internationally, and so that double-suit effects can be prevented
before they arise. In this way, comity is bolstered, litigants are
reassured of their positions, and international business is encouraged.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MULTILATERAL
CONVENTION
The growing number of negative declaratory judgments issued
abroad brings urgency to this contemporary judicial issue. At the
present time, one
may well doubt the wisdom of suing an alien in [a] country where
he has no assets with which to satisfy the prospective judgment. It
may just be simpler, easier and cheaper if from the beginning you
sue him in his own country where he has ample assets. There, one
battle, though in the enemy's camp, will do. If you choose to sue
him first here on your home ground it will take, at least, two battles
(the original suit and the enforcement suit), and more likely, three
battles (the original suit, counter-suit and enforcement suit).179
Unless there is a change in the effectiveness of United States judicial
judgments in foreign forums, or the ability of those foreign tribunals
to issue declarations of nonliability, it would be unwise and inefficient
to sue in United States courts when enforcement will be necessary
abroad.
A sweeping, integrative solution must be devised because the
problem itself is so far-reaching, the outcomes so difficult to predict,
and the potential negative effects so harsh. Many who have ap-
177. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 151, at 30-31; see also Reflections on a General Convention,
supra note 12, at 4-6 (explaining that the Brussels and Lugano Conventions allow Contracting
states to use "exorbitant jurisdictional bases against persons not domiciled in a Contracting
State" and "require other Contracting States to recognize and enforce the resulting judgment").
178. The Lugano Convention links the EFTA members to the EC member states in this free
movement of judicial decisions. Lugano Convention, supra note 147, arts. 26-49, at 15-19.
Hence, EFTA nations would also be closed to recognition and enforcement of a United States
judicial judgment preempted by a state party to the Brussels Convention.
179. Fujita, supra note 7, at 200.
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE-SUIT
proached the dilemma have focused narrowly on one or only a few
aspects of the problem and have thus advocated equally limited
solutions. For example, a recommendation that "American courts
should diligently ... [dismiss] suits that are more properly tried in
other countries," in hopes that "the courts of other countries follow
suit,"'8 ° will not rectify the inconsistent treatment given to double-
suits by United States and foreign courts, nor will it establish reliable
recognition standards between nations. By maintaining the status quo
without harmonizing our procedural standards with those of other
nations, the United States courts will merely hold the line. That
'solution' is not good enough.
A case-by-case balancing of the interests at stake is also not the
appropriate mechanism for determining the proper approach in these
cases. First, while case law has announced various criteria and has
suggested factors to incorporate into any judicial decision regarding
the issuance of an anti-foreign suit injunction, "lower courts have
taken a variety of ... divergent approaches [which] have had the
undesirable effect of treating similarly situated foreign litigants in
unpredictable, disparate ways.'.'. Cases like Laker Airways, China
Trade, Mutual Service, and Gau Shan demonstrate that regardless of
the similarity of the formula, the courts arrive at consistently
inconsistent results."
Second, the types of cases in which these problems arise are
sometimes properly classified as involving a "political question" more
properly left to the other branches of the United States govern-
ment."8 American jurisprudence has long cautioned against courts'
consideration of political questions," 4 and it is well settled that the
executive and legislative branches of our federal government are
180. Teresa D. Baer, Note, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad-"
Towards a Transnational Approach, 37 STAN. L. REV. 155, 186.
181. Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 43 (1987).
182. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
183. See, eg., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (involving the act
of state doctrine, under which United States courts are traditionally precluded from questioning
the validity of public acts that a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own
borders); see generally Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ.
597 (1976) (discussing the role of the courts in deciding political questions).
184. See Louis HEN r N, FOREIGN AFlAiRS AN THE CONSTTuTON 205,208-216 (1972); see
also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198, 203-04 (1962) (holding that courts should not render
decisions on "political questions").
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unquestionably in charge of the foreign affairs power." The result
is great judicial hesitancy to progress in any one direction without
guidance from the political branches.1 6
Finally, the executive and legislative branches have left the courts
alone and unguided in this territory thus far. There is no specific
provision in the Constitution, no domestic law, and no treaty law
which the courts could apply-to arrive at uniform procedures with
certainty. Diplomacy exercised in individual cases, though not widely
utilized at present, has been proposed as an alternative to the judicial
abyss created by the lack of political guidance." This approach,
however, is unfortunately as tenuous as the current approach of the
courts given the considerable amount of political energy, time, and
expense required of the executive branch for each litigation. It is
likely that this solution would be effective in a few extraordinary
cases, perhaps of the magnitude of the Laker Airways litigation, and
would not be initiated to assist with the majority of international
double-suits.
An international convention securing the cooperation of other
nations in resolving this dispute is crucial. United States courts
cannot act unilaterally on this issue with any success: "a comprehen-
sive, integrated solution ... cannot, however, be achieved by
individual legal orders acting independently.' '  Currently, a State
Department initiative to devise a multilateral convention on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is being considered
by the Hague Conference on Private International Law;189 a resolu-
185. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10; U.S. CONST., art. II, §§ 2,3; HENKIN, supra note
184, at 205. But see U.S. CONST., art. III, §2, c. 2 (granting the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, ministers, consuls, and where a state shall be a party).
186. See HENKIN, supra note 184, at 208-16.
187. See Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J.
COMp. L. 579, 581-88 (1983).
188. See United States Delegation to the Special Commission on General Affairs and Policy
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Working Document No. 1, Consider-
ations in Connection with the United States Proposal for Hague Conference Preparation of a
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 1 (June 1, 1992) (on file with
author) (explaining the inefficiency of purely legal, non-integrative solutions by courts to
alleviate the problem of recognition and enforcement) [hereinafter United States Proposal].
189. See Final Act of the Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law 17 (May 29,1993) (Decision b2). The special commission on general affairs
and policy of the Hague Conference will likely meet to take up this charge late in 1995 or early
in 1996 and will tender its recommendations to the full Hague Conference in 1996 at the 18th
session. See Memorandum from Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private
International Law, U.S. Department of State, to the members of Study Group on Judgments of
the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law 1 (July 1,1993) (copy
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tion in support of the initiative was recently approved by the
American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates.'" The goal
of such a convention would be to facilitate the recognition and
enforcement of judicial proceedings in other sovereign tribunals and
to remove current inequities in the system.' These kinds of
sweeping convention mandates would provide for the acceptance of
foreign judgments without interfering with domestic judicial proceed-
ings on recognition and enforcement.' 92
Concluding an international convention on recognition and
enforcement which will encompass the topic of double-suits and
aggressive judicial action will be a difficult task. Historically,
lawmaking in the United States demonstrates that recurring themes
of "unilateralism, a preference for national over international
uniformity, impatience, and penuriousness" have pervaded any United
States attempts to form binding international commitments.'J Our
legal institutions have appeared much more ready to respond to
domestic political and social needs than to any international crisis. 94
These tendencies have contributed to the limitations on cooperation
and dialogue between the United States and other nations which have
resulted in relatively few efforts in the area of harmonizing interna-
tional civil litigation. 95
However, some developments indicate a gradual increase in
United States readiness to cooperate internationally, and thus, an
increase in the likelihood that a convention of this nature is possible.
United States participation in the United Nations Convention of 1958
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
96
the Hague Service"9 and Evidence9" Conventions, and unilateral
on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum on Private International Law].
190. Anthony E. DiResta, Resolution Urges International Pact on Judgments, 19 LrIG.
NEVS, No. 1, Oct. 1993, at 3.
191. See id.
192. See Conclusions on Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 157, at 3-5.
193. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law For
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Summer 1994, No. 3)
(manuscript at 3-4, on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
194. See id. (manuscript at 6).
195. See id. (manuscript at 4-48) (discussing lawmaking approaches and institutions in
historical context); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:
A New Approach for The Hague Conference?, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
Summer 1994, No. 3) (manuscript at 5-6, on file with Law and Contemporary Problems).
196. New York Convention, supra note 175, at 2517, 2566.
197. Multilateral Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, done Nov. 15,
1965, entered into force Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, 372.
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modifications to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ' " demon-
strate the viability of multilateral agreements in private international
law and the United States government's increasing recognition of the
need to engage in dialogue and meaningful international cooperative
efforts in this area.
Addressing concerns over the United States judicial treatment of
the few already existing treaties in the area of private international
law is appropriate before trusting in the success of another convention
with an even broader sweep. For example, the Hague Service
Convention is not consistently interpreted with the same amount of
respect accorded a federal statute.' Also, the Hague Evidence
Convention has not been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be the
exclusive means for obtaining discovery abroad. °" Optimistically,
these problems can be attributed to poor and imprecise drafting.
Thus, it does not necessarily follow that future conventions will fall
victim to contrary or inconsistent judicial interpretations. At least one
commentator believes that many of these problems stem from the
speed with which conventions have been concluded, noting that there
is "not sufficient time for the process of mutual education necessary
for informed cooperation"2" to expect the terms to sufficiently meet
the needs of all the parties. With greater attention to these concerns
and with proper drafting and domestic implementation, there is no
reason to predict that future treaties in international law to which the
United States is a party, will fail.
Recent proposals to build on existing treaties should be noted
before analyzing new treaties that would involve the United States as
a party. Proposals to further modify the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have been offered to bolster the effects of the Hague
198. Multilateral Taking of Evidence Abroad, opend for signature Mar. 18, 1970, entered
into force with respect to the United States of America Oct. 7, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 2556.
199. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF
JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1963); see also Burbank,
supra note 193, (manuscript at 15-19) (discussing changes in Rules 4(i), 28(b), 44, and 44.1 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
200. See Stephen B. Burbank, The World In Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1478-80
(1991) (book review) (discussing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694
(1988)).
201. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. S.D. Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 533-40 (1987).
202. Burbank, supra note 193, (manuscript at 46-47).
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Service and Evidence Conventions, 3 but these modest efforts have
been met with much criticism and have not yet materialized.2
The thrust has thus been shifted to a new multilateral attempt at
harmonizing private international law via a convention on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.0' The discus-
sion surrounding this proposed convention is a useful parallel to the
consideration of a multilateral convention regulating the use of
negative declaratory judgments and anti-suit injunctions in interna-
tional double-suits. It also offers the option of incorporating the
regulations advocated in this Note with this proposed convention.
The proposal for a convention on recognition and enforcement,
initiated by the United States delegation to the June 1992 meeting of
the Special Commission on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (Commission), materialized
only after much deliberation surrounding the decision on the best
international structure to implement a proposal. The United States
State Department had been considering direct negotiations with the
EU and EFTA member states on the subject-a seemingly daunting
task whereby the United States, on its own, would have faced the
block of Brussels and Lugano Convention countries 2 ---and finally
settled on the Commission as a more appropriate forum to address
international recognition and enforcement2 7
The United States has many reasons to desire the results that
only such a multilateral convention could yield, but especially because
other countries give less recognition to United States judgments than
the United States courts give to foreign judgments.2" A multilateral
treaty, rather than a series of bilateral treaties, is necessary because
"[g]enerations would be required for the United States to negotiate
on a bilateral basis a reasonably comprehensive judgments regime"
203. See Letter from Charles Platto, Chairman, International Litigation Committee of the
International Bar Association, to the Honorable James E. Macklin, Jr., Secretary, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Mar. 14, 1990) (photocopy on file with author).
204. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lawrence Collins, Partner, Herbert Smith Solicitors, (Apr.
2,1990) (photocopy on file with author) (responding with strong dissent to the letter written on
behalf of the International Litigation Committee of the International Bar Association which
supported proposed amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., Rules 4 and 26); see also Gary
Born, Fishing for Trouble in Foreign Depths, LEGAL TIMES, week of Apr. 8, 1991, at 29, 29.
205. Von Mehren, supra note 195 (manuscript at 1-5).
206. kd (manuscript at 25-29).
207. See Conclusions on Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 157, at 3-5; Reflections on a
General Convention, supra note 12, at 16-18.
208. See von Mehren, supra note 195, (manuscript at 18-19); see also Reflections on a General
Convention, supra note 12, at 4-6.
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and because a scheme of bilateral treaties would have to be based on
a relatively strict model so that the purpose of uniformity between
nations is not ultimately undermined.2"
Provisions parallel to those of the Brussels Convention would be
more likely to result in quick agreement and implementation with
convention members. However, modifications to those terms will be
necessary in order to integrate the United States into any agreement
with the European trading block members, because the United States
is "less closely linked economically, geographically, and politically"
than are those nations.2 10 A successful convention should parallel
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions because "[p]arallelism will...
facilitate uniformity in commercial practices and promote understand-
ing of jurisdiction and recognition problems. 21 ' A convention with
such similar terms would, at conception, possess greater legitimacy
and a resulting likelihood of treaty success. 212  The multilateral
convention could thus offer the uniformity, predictability, and
simplicity sought by the contracting judicial systems and their
litigants. 3
The issues dealt with in this Note, specifically the international
treatment of parallel, concurrent suits, could be addressed within the
broader structure of a convention on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. The recently proposed convention, however, is
not the only possible alternative for confronting these issues. A more
narrow convention, loosely based on the Brussels Convention's
Articles 21-24, also has the potential to succeed.2 4  Because the
Brussels Convention does not yet address the aspect of the double-
suit dilemma whereby a signatory state and a nonsignatory state are
in conflict, Brussels Convention member states (including the Lugano
signatories) should be favorably disposed to concluding a uniform
agreement with other nations, particularly an agreement which is
modeled in some form on their own provisions.
It is beyond the scope of this Note to explore the specific
provisions of such a proposed document; however, it is worthwhile to
209. See von Mehren, supra note 195, (manuscript at 22).
210. Id. (manuscript at 5).
211. Id. (manuscript at 41-42); cf. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational
Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming Summer 1994, No. 3) (discussing substantive issues which should be included in
a new convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments).
212. See N.Y. STATE BAR REPORT, supra note 21, at 2-3.
213. See United States Proposal, supra note 188, at 3.
214. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
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consider the underlying goals and broad provisions which ought to be
addressed by such a convention. Initially, the United States should
seek as many willing signatories as possible, looking first to its major
trading partners. The block of EU and EFTA nations should become
involved since the proposed convention will largely parallel many of
their own already existing convention provisions, and the double-suit
dilemma often arises between the United States and members of that
bloc. Thus, the Hague may again be a good structure for the
convention.215
The convention should require that the United States and other
signatories abandon the discretionary, ad hoc approach currently
employed to dispose of international cases caught in this awkward
situation. The provisions should rest on other existing conventions
such as those requiring service of process, a concept "closely tied-not
only to the lis pendens idea-but also to the broader conception of
jurisdiction: a court can hardly be competent to decide the rights of
a defendant who has not received proper notice of the action against
him."2
1 6
The race to the courthouse to choose the forum in which an
action will be heard should be tempered by a provision regulating the
use and abuse of preemptive strikes. One way to achieve this is by
establishing a presumption against the use of declaratory judgments
of nonliability. Negative declaratory judgments should be prohibited
except where they are absolutely necessary as a final alternative and
where they are the least offensive means to enforce domestic laws.
That situation will most often occur where one forum is issuing an
anti-foreign suit injunction that ultimately threatens the jurisdiction of
another sovereign tribunal. This latter judicial tool should be
abandoned in conjunction with the declaratory judgment of
nonliability. Without a comprehensive measure of control, one
judicial mechanism could exist without the counter-mechanism to
control its application and the Convention would prove to be
ineffective. If all signatories agree to simultaneously limit the use of
both negative declaratory judgments and anti-suit injunctions, neither
measure will be needed in any but the most extreme circumstances.
When tribunals do utilize their remaining discretion and employ one
of these measures, they will be risking condemnation by other
signatories if their use is not wholly justified by one of the above-
215. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text
216. LOOKOFsKY, supra note 151, at 92.
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mentioned situations. A system in which neither of these tools is
employed with regularity will contribute to the preservation of the
integrity of judicial judgments. Consequently, the ability of courts to
apply and enforce domestic laws for the foreign defendants over
whom they have valid in personam jurisdiction will be strengthened.
Problems necessarily arise with this proposal. The greatest
potential difficulty is highlighted by an assessment of other countries'
positions on this subject. United States courts rarely if ever issue
declaratory judgments of nonliability.27 Although they have issued
anti-foreign suit injunctions, it has most often been in instances where
the courts have been threatened by these declarations of nonliability
from a foreign jurisdiction. Foreign jurisdictions are more likely to
make declarations of nonliability, and thus have the leverage in the
negotiations. In the context of a broader convention which would
address judicial measures like negative declaratory judgments as an
aspect of the larger problem of recognition and enforcement, there
exists the similar perception that the United States has more to gain
than other states whose judgments are largely enforced by United
States courts. The other states must be reminded that a convention
would benefit all Hague Conference Member States and other states
in Eastern Europe.218 Because it is essential to secure commitments
to abstain from these practices by the foreign nations which most
frequently utilize such tactics, the foreign parties must perceive some
tangible gain from the United States.
United States negotiators need to search for sufficient bargaining
chips to offer other nations. For example, they should weigh carefully
the real value to our judiciary of such practices as "tag" service to
gain jurisdiction over potential defendants.219 "Tag" service and
other similar United States judicial methods are perceived by most
other nations as "exorbitant" exercises of jurisdiction and are
practices many countries would be glad to see the United States
forego."° A multilateral agreement clarifying judicially acceptable
217. One example of the rare exception to this statement is McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Islamic Rep. of Iran, 591 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Mo. 1984). However, this case is a unique
exception involving an unusual and temporary international political situation requiring
preemptive judicial action.
218. Memorandum on Private International Law, supra note 189, at 2.
219. "Tag service" premises jurisdiction to adjudication solely on the fact that the defendant
was served in the forum state. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
220. The subject of "tag" jurisdiction was raised in the Working Group Meeting on
enforcement of judgments, and listed as one ground for jurisdiction which may be excluded.
Conclusions on Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 157, at 11.
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activities could be formulated to benefit all nations, for "all sovereign
states... [do] have a substantial interest in regulating the progress of
litigation in [their] own courts.)'
United States courts exist to uphold and enforce the laws of the
United States and to protect the litigants who come before them.
They have an interest in protecting their jurisdiction and the force of
their subsequent judgments. Inconsistency due to lack of understand-
ing about the full ramifications of foreign declarations has caused
divergent case resolutions ranging from the issuance of offensive anti-
suit injunctions to the lack of any action taken with regard to foreign
proceedings for negative declarations. Reliance on comity and
judicial interest balancing has proven ineffective for United States
courts. An international understanding must be reached to achieve
the reciprocity now absent in the international arena.
V.. CONCLUSION
The time has come for the United States to take affirmative steps
toward merging with other foreign jurisdictions in these key areas of
international civil procedure.m The proposal for a multilateral
convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
could provide the framework into which provisions regulating the use
of declaratory judgments of nonliability and its counterpart, the anti-
foreign suit injunction, could be incorporated. A convention which
addresses only the limited issues involved in double-suits may prove
to be more successful and less offensive to United States judicial
policy, however, and should be considered as a valid alternative.
Perhaps with ingenuity and a willingness to bargain on the part
of all nations concerned, the United States can succeed in forging a
multilateral convention to halt these offensive judicial practices. Such
a multilateral approach, creating uniformity of substantive and
procedural rules and enforcement mechanisms, should "in itself be
sufficient to provide certainty and efficiency to those in international
business."' In conjunction with an encouraged, though not man-
dated, principle of passive lis pendens and the prohibition of anti-suit
221. United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985).
222. While this Note does propose that the United States initiate a multinational effort to
stem international double-suits, it does not premise this position on solely nationalistic
motivations. The international double-suit harms litigants and tribunals irrespective of the
country concerned; their regulation should be an international judicial priority.
223. Westin, supra note 142, at 360.
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injunctions except in the most extreme circumstances, declaratory
judgments of nonliability should rarely, if ever, be necessary.
Courts and their litigants will benefit from clearly defined
international rules which neutralize differing cultural, legal, and
economic expectations and create a more uniform judicial system to
encourage effective business and trade. Any further confusion about
judicial recognition and authority in foreign tribunals will only further
"disserve[] the goals of fairness, sound judicial administration, and
friendly international relations." 4  An effective, yet focused
multilateral convention controlling the use of offensive judicial
weapons like the anti-suit injunction and the negative declaratory
judgment would serve the common interest of all sovereign tribunals.
Julie E. Dowler
224. Born, supra note 181, at 1.
